Outline for May 27, 2004

Reading: Chapters 15, 18

Outline for the Day

- 1. Access Control Lists
 - a. ACLs: describe, revocation issue
- 2. Capabilities
 - a. Capability-based addressing: show picture of accessing object
 - b. Show process limiting access by not inheriting all parent's capabilities
 - c. Revocation: use of a global descriptor table
- 3. Privilege in Languages
 - a. Nesting program units
 - b. Temporary upgrading of privileges
- 4. Lock and Key
 - a. Associate with each object a lock; associate with each process that has access to object a key (it's a cross between ACLs and C-Lists)
 - b. Example: use crypto (Gifford). X object enciphered with key K. Associate an opener R with X. Then: OR-Access: K can be recovered with any D_i in a list of n deciphering transformations, so

 $R = (E_1(K), E_2(K), ..., E_n(K))$ and any process with access to any of the D_i 's can access the file

- AND-Access: need all *n* deciphering functions to get *K*: $R = E_1(E_2(...E_n(K)...))$
- c. Types and locks
- 5. MULTICS ring mechanism
 - a. MULTICS rings: used for both data and procedures; rights are REWA
 - b. (b_1, b_2) access bracket can access freely; (b_3, b_4) call bracket can call segment through gate; so if *a*'s access bracket is (32,35) and its call bracket is (36,39), then *assuming permission mode (REWA) allows access*, a procedure in:

rings 0-31: can access a, but ring-crossing fault occurs

rings 32-35: can access *a*, no ring-crossing fault

rings 36-39: can access a, provided a valid gate is used as an entry point

rings 40-63: cannot access a

- c. If the procedure is accessing a data segment d, no call bracket allowed; given the above, assuming permission mode (REWA) allows access, a procedure in: rings 0-32: can access d rings 33-35: can access d, but cannot write to it (W or A) rings 36-63: cannot access d
- 6. Assurance
 - a. Trust and assurance