

## Outline for January 24, 2008

1. Expressive power
  - a. HRU vs. SPM
  - b. Multiparent joint creates in HRU
  - c. Adding multiparent joint creates to SPM (giving ESPM)
  - d. Simulation of multiparent joint creates by 2-parent joint creates
  - e. Monotonic ESPM, monotonic HRU equivalent
  - f. Safety question in ESPM decidable if acyclic attenuating scheme
2. Comparing Expressive Power of Models
  - a. Graph representation
  - b. Simulate 3-parent joint create using 2-parent joint create
  - c. Correspondence between two schemes in terms of graph representation
  - d. Formal definition of scheme A simulating scheme B
  - e. Model expressive power
  - f. Result: monotonic 1-parent models less expressive than monotonic multiparent models (so ESPM more expressive than SPM)
3. Typed Access Matrix Model
  - a. Add notion of type for entities — set of types  $T$ , set of subject types  $TS \subseteq T$
  - b. New create rules: specify subject/object type
  - c. Safety decidable for systems with acyclic MTAM schemes
4. Security policies and mechanisms
  - a. Policy vs. mechanism
  - b. Secure, precise
  - c. Observability postulate
  - d. Theorem: for any program  $p$  and policy  $c$ , there is a secure, precise mechanism  $m^*$  such that, for all security mechanisms  $m$  associated with  $p$  and  $c$ ,  $m^* \approx m$
  - e. Theorem: There is no effective procedure that determines a maximally precise, secure mechanism for any policy and program
5. Bell-LaPadula Model: intuitive, security classifications only
  - a. Show level, categories, define clearance and classification
  - b. Lattice: poset with  $\leq$  relation reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive; greatest lower bound, least upper bound
  - c. Apply lattice
    - i. Set of classes  $SC$  is a partially ordered set under relation  $dom$  with  $glb$  (greatest lower bound),  $lub$  (least upper bound) operators
    - ii. Note:  $dom$  is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric
    - iii. Example:  $(A, C) dom (A', C')$  iff  $A \leq A'$  and  $C \subseteq C'$ ;  $lub((A, C), (A', C')) = (max(A, A'), C \cup C')$ ,  $glb((A, C), (A', C')) = (min(A, A'), C \cap C')$
  - d. Simple security condition (no reads up), \*-property (no writes down), discretionary security property
  - e. Basic Security Theorem: if it is secure and transformations follow these rules, it will remain secure
  - f. Maximum, current security level