Low-level entities are objects; all objects concerning the same corporation form a CD (company dataset); CDs whose corporations are in competition are grouped into COIs (Conflict of Interest classes)
Intuitive goal: keep one subject from reading different CDs in the same COI, or reading one CD and writing to another in same COI
Simple Security Property: Read access granted if the object:
is in the same CD as an object already accessed by the subject; or
is in a CD in an entirely different COI.
Theorems:
Once a subject has accessed an object, only other objects in that CD are available within that COI;
Subject has access to at most 1 dataset in each COI class
Exceptions: sanitized information
*-Property: Write access is permitted only if:
Read access is permitted by the simple security property; and
No object in a different CD in that COI can be read, unless it contains sanitized information
Key result: information can only flow within a CD or from sanitized information
Comparison to BLP
Comparison to Clark-Wilson
Clinical Information System Security model
Intended for medical records; goals are confidentiality, authentication of annotators, and integrity
Patients, personal health information, clinician
Assumptions and origin of principles
Access principles
Creation principle
Deletion principle
Confinement principle
Aggregation principle
Enforcement principle
Comparison to Bell-LaPadula: lattice structure but different focus