Lecture 16

- Policy composition approaches
- Noninterference
  - Access control matrix interpretation
- Policy composition
  - Composing noninterfering machines may not produce a noninterfering machine!

Model

- System as state machine
  - Subjects $S = \{ s_i \}$
  - States $\Sigma = \{ \sigma_i \}$
  - Outputs $O = \{ o_i \}$
  - Commands $Z = \{ z_i \}$
  - State transition commands $C = S \times Z$
- Note: no inputs
  - Encode either as selection of commands or in state transition commands

Functions

- State transition function T: $C \times \Sigma \rightarrow \Sigma$
  - Describes effect of executing command c in state σ
- Output function P: $C \times \Sigma \rightarrow O$
  - Output of machine when executing command c in state σ
- Initial state is σ_0

Example

- Users Heidi (high), Lucy (low)
- 2 bits of state, H (high) and L (low)
  - System state is (H, L) where H, L are 0, 1
- 2 commands: xor_0, xor_1 do xor with 0, 1
  - Operations affect *both* state bits regardless of whether Heidi or Lucy issues it

Example: 2-bit Machine

- $S = \{ \text{Heidi}, \text{Lucy} \}$
- $\Sigma = \{ (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1) \}$
- $C = \{ xor_0, xor_1 \}$

	Input States (H, L)			
	(0,0)	(0,1)	(1,0)	(1,1)
xor0	(0,0)	(0,1)	(1,0)	(1,1)
xor1	(1,1)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(0,0)

Outputs and States

- T is inductive in first argument, as

  $T(c_0, \sigma_0) = \sigma_1;\ T(c_{i+1}, \sigma_{i+1}) = T(c_{i+1}, \mathrm{T}(c_i, \sigma_i))$
- Let C^* be set of possible sequences of commands in C
- $T^*: C^* \times \Sigma \rightarrow \Sigma$ and

  $c_s = c_0 \ldots c_n \Rightarrow T^*(c_s, \sigma_i) = T(c_n, \ldots, T(c_0, \sigma_i) \ldots)$
- P similar; define P^* similarly

Projection

- $T^*(c_s,\sigma_i)$ sequence of state transitions
- $P^*(c_s,\sigma_i)$ corresponding outputs
- $proj(s, c_s, \sigma_i)$ set of outputs in $P^*(c_s,\sigma_i)$ that subject s authorized to see
  - In same order as they occur in $P^*(c_s,\sigma_i)$
  - Projection of outputs for s
- Intuition: list of outputs after removing outputs that s cannot see

Purge

- $G \subseteq S$, G a group of subjects
- $A \subseteq Z$, A a set of commands
- $\pi_G(c_s)$ subsequence of c_s with all elements (s,z), $s \in G$ deleted
- $\pi_A(c_s)$ subsequence of c_s with all elements (s,z), $z \in A$ deleted
- $\pi_{G,A}(c_s)$ subsequence of c_s with all elements (s,z), $s \in G$ and $z \in A$ deleted

Example: 2-bit Machine

- Let $\sigma_0 = (0,1)$
- 3 commands applied:
  - Heidi applies xor_0
  - Lucy applies xor_1
  - Heidi applies xor_1
- $c_s = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0), (\text{Lucy}, xor_1), (\text{Heidi}, xor_0))$
- Output is 011001
  - Shorthand for sequence (0,1)(1,0)(0,1)

Example

- $proj(\text{Heidi}, c_s, \sigma_0) = 011001$
- $proj(\text{Lucy}, c_s, \sigma_0) = 101$
- $\pi_{\text{Lucy}}(c_s) = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0), (\text{Heidi}, xor_1))$
- $\pi_{\text{Lucy}, xor1}(c_s) = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0), (\text{Heidi}, xor_1))$
- $\pi_{\text{Heidi}}(c_s) = ((\text{Lucy}, xor_1))$

Example

- $\pi_{\text{Lucy},xor0}(c_s) = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0), (\text{Lucy}, xor_1),$
  $(\text{Heidi}, xor_1))$
- $\pi_{\text{Heidi},xor0}(c_s) = \pi_{xor0}(c_s) = ((\text{Lucy}, xor_1),$
  $(\text{Heidi}, xor_1))$
- $\pi_{\text{Heidi},xor1}(c_s) = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0), (\text{Lucy}, xor_1))$
- $\pi_{xor1}(c_s) = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0))$

Noninterference

- Intuition: Set of outputs Lucy can see corresponds to set of inputs she can see, there is no interference
- Formally: $G, G' \subseteq S$, $G \neq G'$; $A \subseteq Z$; Users in G executing commands in A are *noninterfering* with users in G' iff for all $c_s \in C^*$, and for all $s \in G'$,

$$proj(s, c_s, \sigma_i) = proj(s, \pi_{G,A}(c_s), \sigma_i)$$

  – Written $A,G :| G'$

Example

- Let $c_s = ((\text{Heidi}, xor_0), (\text{Lucy}, xor_1), (\text{Heidi}, xor_1))$ and $\sigma_0 = (0, 1)$
- Take $G = \{ \text{Heidi} \}$, $G' = \{ \text{Lucy} \}$, $A = \varnothing$
- $\pi_{\text{Heidi}}(c_s) = ((\text{Lucy}, xor_1))$
  - So $proj(\text{Lucy}, \pi_{\text{Heidi}}(c_s), \sigma_0) = 0$
- $\text{proj}(\text{Lucy}, c_s, \sigma_0) = 101$
- So { Heidi } :| { Lucy } is false
  - Makes sense; commands issued to change *H* bit also affect *L* bit

Example

- Same as before, but Heidi's commands affect *H* bit only, Lucy's the *L* bit only
- Output is $0_H 0_L 1_H$
- $\pi_{\text{Heidi}}(c_s) = ((\text{Lucy}, xor1))$
  - So $proj(\text{Lucy}, \pi_{\text{Heidi}}(c_s), \sigma_0) = 0$
- $\text{proj}(\text{Lucy}, c_s, \sigma_0) = 0$
- So { Heidi } :| { Lucy } is true
  - Makes sense; commands issued to change *H* bit now do not affect *L* bit

Security Policy

- Partitions systems into authorized, unauthorized states
- Authorized states have no forbidden interferences
- Hence a *security policy* is a set of noninterference assertions
  - See previous definition

Alternative Development

- System X is a set of protection domains

$$D = \{ d_1, \ldots, d_n \}$$

- When command c executed, it is executed in protection domain $dom(c)$
- Give alternate versions of definitions shown previously

Output-Consistency

- $c \in C, dom(c) \in D$
- $\sim^{dom(c)}$ equivalence relation on states of system X
- $\sim^{dom(c)}$ *output-consistent* if

  $\sigma_a \sim^{dom(c)} \sigma_b \Rightarrow P(c, \sigma_a) = P(c, \sigma_b)$
- Intuition: states are output-consistent if for subjects in $dom(c)$, projections of outputs for both states after c are the same

Security Policy

- $D = \{ d_1, \ldots, d_n \}$, d_i a protection domain
- r: $D \times D$ a reflexive relation
- Then r defines a security policy
- Intuition: defines how information can flow around a system
  - $d_i r d_j$ means info can flow from d_i to d_j
  - $d_i r d_i$ as info can flow within a domain

Projection Function

- π' analogue of π, earlier
- Commands, subjects absorbed into protection domains
- $d \in D, c \in C, c_s \in C^*$
- $\pi'_d(\nu) = \nu$
- $\pi'_d(c_s c) = \pi'_d(c_s)c$ if $dom(c) r d$
- $\pi'_d(c_s c) = \pi'_d(c_s)$ otherwise
- Intuition: if executing c interferes with d, then c is visible; otherwise, as if c never executed

Noninterference-Secure

- System has set of protection domains D
- System is noninterference-secure with respect to policy r if

$$P^*(c, T^*(c_s, \sigma_0)) = P^*(c, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_0))$$

- Intuition: if executing c_s causes the same transitions for subjects in domain d as does its projection with respect to domain d, then no information flows in violation of the policy

Lemma

- Let $T^*(c_s, \sigma_0) \sim^d T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_0)$ for $c \in C$
- If $\sim^{\mathrm{d}}$ output-consistent, then system is noninterference-secure with respect to policy *r*

Proof

- $d = dom(c)$ for $c \in C$
- By definition of output-consistent,

$$T^*(c_s, \sigma_0) \sim^d T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_0)$$

implies

$$P^*(c, T^*(c_s, \sigma_0)) = P^*(c, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_0))$$

- This is definition of noninterference-secure with respect to policy r

Unwinding Theorem

- Links security of sequences of state transition commands to security of individual state transition commands
- Allows you to show a system design is ML secure by showing it matches specs from which certain lemmata derived
  - Says *nothing* about security of system, because of implementation, operation, *etc*. issues

Locally Respects

- r is a policy
- System X locally respects r if $dom(c)$ being noninterfering with $d \in D$ implies $\sigma_a \sim^d T(c, \sigma_a)$
- Intuition: applying c under policy r to system X has no effect on domain d when X locally respects r

Transition-Consistent

- r policy, $d \in D$
- If $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$ implies $T(c, \sigma_a) \sim^d T(c, \sigma_b)$, system X transition-consistent under r
- Intuition: command c does not affect equivalence of states under policy r

Lemma

- $c_1, c_2 \in C, d \in D$
- For policy r, $dom(c_1)rd$ and $dom(c_2)rd$
- Then

$$T^*(c_1c_2,\sigma) = T(c_1,T(c_2,\sigma)) = T(c_2,T(c_1,\sigma))$$

- Intuition: if info can flow from domains of commands into d, then order doesn't affect result of applying commands

Theorem

- r policy, X system that is output consistent, transition consistent, locally respects r
- X noninterference-secure with respect to policy r
- Significance: basis for analyzing systems claiming to enforce noninterference policy
  - Establish conditions of theorem for particular set of commands, states with respect to some policy, set of protection domains
  - Noninterference security with respect to r follows

Proof

- Must show $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$ implies

$$T^*(c_s, \sigma_a) \sim^d T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_b)$$

- Induct on length of c_s
- Basis: $c_s = \nu$, so $\mathrm{T}^*(c_s, \sigma) = \sigma$; $\pi'_d(\nu) = \nu$; claim holds
- Hypothesis: $c_s = c_1 \ldots c_n$; then claim holds

Induction Step

- Consider $c_s c_{n+1}$. Assume $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$ and look at $T^*(\pi'_d(c_s c_{n+1}), \sigma_b)$
- 2 cases:
  - $dom(c_{n+1}) rd$ holds
  - $dom(c_{n+1}) rd$ does not hold

$dom(c_{n+1})rd$ Holds

$T^*(\pi'_d(c_s c_{n+1}), \sigma_b) = T^*(\pi'_d(c_s) c_{n+1}, \sigma_b)$
$= T(c_{n+1}, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_b))$

- by definition of T^* and π'_d

- $T(c_{n+1}, \sigma_a) \sim^d T(c_{n+1}, \sigma_b)$
  - as X transition-consistent and $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$
- $T(c_{n+1}, T^*(c_s, \sigma_a)) \sim^d T(c_{n+1}, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_b))$
  - by transition-consistency and IH

$dom(c_{n+1})rd$ Holds

$T(c_{n+1}, T^*(c_s, \sigma_a)) \sim^d T(c_{n+1}, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s)c_{n+1}, \sigma_b))$

– by substitution from earlier equality

$T(c_{n+1}, T^*(c_s, \sigma_a)) \sim^d T(c_{n+1}, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s)c_{n+1}, \sigma_b))$

– by definition of T^*

- proving hypothesis

$dom(c_{n+1})rd$ Does Not Hold

$T^*(\pi'_d(c_s c_{n+1}), \sigma_b) = T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_b)$

– by definition of π'_d

$T^*(c_s, \sigma_b) = T^*(\pi'_d(c_s c_{n+1}), \sigma_b)$

– by above and IH

$T(c_{n+1}, T^*(c_s, \sigma_a)) \sim^d T^*(c_s, \sigma_a)$

– as X locally respects r, so $\sigma \sim^d T(c_{n+1}, \sigma)$ for any σ

$T(c_{n+1}, T^*(c_s, \sigma_a)) \sim^d T(c_{n+1}, T^*(\pi'_d(c_s) c_{n+1}, \sigma_b))$

– substituting back

- proving hypothesis

Finishing Proof

- Take $\sigma_a = \sigma_b = \sigma_0$, so from claim proved by induction,

$$T^*(c_s, \sigma_0) \sim^d T^*(\pi'_d(c_s), \sigma_0)$$

- By previous lemma, as X (and so $\sim^d$) output consistent, then X is noninterference-secure with respect to policy r

Access Control Matrix

- Example of interpretation
- Given: access control information
- Question: are given conditions enough to provide noninterference security?
- Assume: system in a particular state
  - Encapsulates values in ACM

ACM Model

- Objects $L = \{ l_1, \ldots, l_m \}$
  - Locations in memory
- Values $V = \{ v_1, \ldots, v_n \}$
  - Values that L can assume
- Set of states $\Sigma = \{ \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_k \}$
- Set of protection domains $D = \{ d_1, \ldots, d_j \}$

Functions

- *value*: $L \times \Sigma \to V$
  - returns value v stored in location l when system in state σ
- *read*: $D \to 2^V$
  - returns set of objects observable from domain d
- *write*: $D \to 2^V$
  - returns set of objects observable from domain d

Interpretation of ACM

- Functions represent ACM
  - Subject s in domain d, object o
  - $r \in A[s, o]$ if $o \in read(d)$
  - $w \in A[s, o]$ if $o \in write(d)$
- Equivalence relation:

$$[\sigma_a \sim^{dom(c)} \sigma_b] \Leftrightarrow [\ \forall l_i \in read(d)\ [\ value(l_i, \sigma_a) = value(l_i, \sigma_b)\ ]\ ]$$

  - You can read the *exactly* the same locations in both states

Enforcing Policy *r*

- 5 requirements
  - 3 general ones describing dependence of commands on rights over input and output
    - Hold for all ACMs and policies
  - 2 that are specific to some security policies
    - Hold for *most* policies

Enforcing Policy *r*: First

- Output of command *c* executed in domain *dom*(*c*) depends only on values for which subjects in *dom*(*c*) have read access

$$\sigma_a \sim^{dom(c)} \sigma_b \Rightarrow P(c, \sigma_a) = P(c, \sigma_b)$$

Enforcing Policy r: Second

- If c changes l_i, then c can only use values of objects in $read(dom(c))$ to determine new value

$$[\ \sigma_a \sim^{dom(c)} \sigma_b \ and$$
$$(value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) \neq value(l_i, \sigma_a) \ or$$
$$value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_b)) \neq value(l_i, \sigma_b))\ ] \Rightarrow$$
$$value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) = value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_b))$$

Enforcing Policy *r*: Third

- If c changes l_i, then $dom(c)$ provides subject executing c with write access to l_i

$$value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) \neq value(l_i, \sigma_a) \Rightarrow l_i \in write(dom(c))$$

Enforcing Policies *r*: Fourth

- If domain u can interfere with domain v, then every object that can be read in u can also be read in v
- So if object o cannot be read in u, but can be read in v; and object o' in u can be read in v, then info flows from o to o', then to v

Let $u, v \in D$; then $urv \Rightarrow read(u) \subseteq read(v)$

Enforcing Policies r: Fifth

- Subject s can write object o in v, subject s' can read o in u, then domain v can interfere with domain u

$$l_i \in read(u) \text{ and } l_i \in write(v) \Rightarrow v r u$$

Theorem

- Let X be a system satisfying the five conditions. The X is noninterference-secure with respect to r
- Proof: must show X output-consistent, locally respects r, transition-consistent
  - Then by unwinding theorem, theorem holds

Output-Consistent

- Take equivalence relation to be $\sim^d$, first condition *is* definition of output-consistent

Locally Respects r

- Proof by contradiction: assume $(dom(c), d) \notin r$ but $\sigma_a \sim^d T(c, \sigma_a)$ does not hold
- Some object has value changed by c:

  $$\exists\, l_i \in read(d)\ [\ value(l_i, \sigma_a) \neq \mathrm{value}(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a))\ ]$$

- Condition 3: $l_i \in write(d)$
- Condition 5: $dom(c) r d$, contradiction
- So $\sigma_a \sim^d T(c, \sigma_a)$ holds, meaning X locally respects r

Transition Consistency

- Assume $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$
- Must show

$$\text{value}(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) = value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_b))$$

for $l_i \in read(d)$

- 3 cases dealing with change that c makes in l_i in states σ_a, σ_b

Case 1

- $value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) \neq value(l_i, \sigma_a)$
- Condition 3: $l_i \in write(dom(c))$
- As $l_i \in read(d)$, condition 5 says $dom(c) r d$
- Condition 4 says $read(dom(c)) \subseteq read(d)$
- As $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$, $\sigma_a \sim^{dom(c)} \sigma_b$
- Condition 2:

$$value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) = value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_b))$$

- So $T(c, \sigma_a) \sim^{dom(c)} T(c, \sigma_b)$, as desired

Case 2

- $value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_\mathrm{b})) \neq value(l_i, \sigma_\mathrm{b})$
- Condition 3: $l_i \in write(dom(c))$
- As $l_i \in read(d)$, condition 5 says $dom(c) r d$
- Condition 4 says $read(dom(c)) \subseteq read(d)$
- As $\sigma_\mathrm{a} \sim^{d} \sigma_\mathrm{b}$, $\sigma_\mathrm{a} \sim^{dom(c)} \sigma_\mathrm{b}$
- Condition 2:

$$value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_\mathrm{a})) = value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_\mathrm{b}))$$

- So $T(c, \sigma_\mathrm{a}) \sim^{dom(c)} T(c, \sigma_\mathrm{b})$, as desired

Case 3

- Neither of the previous two
  - $value(l_i, T(c, \sigma_a)) = value(l_i, \sigma_a)$
  - $value(l_i, T(\mathrm{c}, \sigma_b)) = value(l_i, \sigma_b)$
- Interpretation of $\sigma_a \sim^d \sigma_b$ is:
  for $l_i \in read(d)$, $value(l_i, \sigma_a) = value(l_i, \sigma_b)$
- So $T(c, \sigma_a) \sim^d T(c, \sigma_b)$, as desired
- In all 3 cases, X transition-consistent

Policies Changing Over Time

- Problem: previous analysis assumes static system
  - In real life, ACM changes as system commands issued
- Example: $w \in C^*$ leads to current state
  - $cando(w, s, z)$ holds if s can execute z in current state
  - Condition noninterference on *cando*
  - If $\neg cando(w, \text{Lara}, \text{"write } f\text{"})$, Lara can't interfere with any other user by writing file f

Generalize Noninterference

- $G \subseteq S$ group of subjects, $A \subseteq Z$ set of commands, p predicate over elements of C^*
- $c_s = (c_1, \ldots, c_n) \in C^*$
- $\pi''(\nu) = \nu$
- $\pi''((c_1, \ldots, c_n)) = (c_1', \ldots, c_n')$
  - $c_i' = \nu$ if $p(c_1', \ldots, c_{i-1}')$ and $c_i = (s, z)$ with $s \in G$ and $z \in A$
  - $c_i' = c_i$ otherwise

Intuition

- $\pi''(c_s) = c_s$
- But if p holds, and element of c_s involves both command in A and subject in G, replace corresponding element of c_s with empty command ν
  - Just like deleting entries from c_s as $\pi_{A,G}$ does earlier

Noninterference

- $G, G' \subseteq S$ groups of subjects, $A \subseteq Z$ set of commands, p predicate over C^*
- Users in G executing commands in A are noninterfering with users in G' under condition p iff, for all $c_s \in C^*$, all $s \in G'$, $proj(s, c_s, \sigma_i) = proj(s, \pi''(c_s), \sigma_i)$
  – Written A,G :| G' **if** p

Example

- From earlier one, simple security policy based on noninterference:

  $\forall(s \in S)\ \forall(z \in Z)$

  $$[\ \{z\}, \{s\} :\mid S \textbf{ if } \neg cando(w, s, z)\ ]$$

- If subject can't execute command (the $\neg$*cando* part), subject can't use that command to interfere with another subject

Another Example

- Consider system in which rights can be passed
  - $pass(s, z)$ gives s right to execute z
  - $w_n = v_1, \ldots, v_n$ sequence of $v_i \in C^*$
  - $prev(w_n) = w_{n-1}$; $\text{last}(w_n) = v_n$

Policy

- No subject *s* can use *z* to interfere if, in previous state, *s* did not have right to *z*, and no subject gave it to *s*

$\{ z \}, \{ s \} :| S$ **if**

$$[\ \neg cando(prev(w), s, z) \wedge$$
$$[\ cando(prev(w), s', pass(s, z)) \Rightarrow$$
$$\neg last(w) = (s', pass(s, z))\ ]\ ]$$

Effect

- Suppose $s_1 \in S$ can execute $pass(s_2, z)$
- For all $w \in C^*$, $cando(w, s_1, pass(s_2, z))$ true
- Initially, $cando(\nu, s_2, z)$ false
- Let $z' \in Z$ be such that (s_3, z') noninterfering with (s_2, z)
  – So for each w_n with $v_n = (s_3, z')$,

$$cando(w_n, s_2, z) = cando(w_{n-1}, s_2, z)$$

Effect

- Then policy says for all $s \in S$

  $$proj(s, ((s_2, z), (s_1, pass(s_2, z)), (s_3, z'), (s_2, z)), \sigma_i)$$
  $$= proj(s, ((s_1, pass(s_2, z)), (s_3, z'), (s_2, \mathrm{z})), \sigma_i)$$

- So s_2's first execution of z does not affect any subject's observation of system

Policy Composition I

- Assumed: Output function of input
  - Means deterministic (else not function)
  - Means uninterruptability (differences in timings can cause differences in states, hence in outputs)
- This result for deterministic, noninterference-secure systems

Compose Systems

- Louie, Dewey LOW
- Hughie HIGH
- b_L output buffer
  - Anyone can read it
- b_H input buffer
  - From HIGH source
- Hughie reads from:
  - b_{LH} (Louie writes)
  - b_{LDH} (Louie, Dewey write)
  - b_{DH} (Dewey writes)



Systems Secure

- All noninterference-secure
  - Hughie has no output
    - So inputs don't interfere with it
  - Louie, Dewey have no input
    - So (nonexistent) inputs don't interfere with outputs



Security of Composition

- Buffers finite, sends/receives blocking: composition *not* secure!
  - Example: assume b_{DH}, b_{LH} have capacity 1
- Algorithm:
  1. Louie (Dewey) sends message to b_{LH} (b_{DH})
     - Fills buffer
  2. Louie (Dewey) sends second message to b_{LH} (b_{DH})
  3. Louie (Dewey) sends a 0 (1) to b_L
  4. Louie (Dewey) sends message to b_{LDH}
     - Signals Hughie that Louie (Dewey) completed a cycle

Hughie

- Reads bit from b_H
  - If 0, receive message from b_{LH}
  - If 1, receive message from b_{DH}
- Receive on b_{LDH}
  - To wait for buffer to be filled

Example

- Hughie reads 0 from b_H
  - Reads message from b_{LH}
- Now Louie's second message goes into b_{LH}
  - Louie completes setp 2 and writes 0 into b_L
- Dewey blocked at step 1
  - Dewey cannot write to b_L
- Symmetric argument shows that Hughie reading 1 produces a 1 in b_L
- So, input from b_H copied to output b_L